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Abstract
This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best
candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates.
Committee members have independent private values information about
the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candi-
date according to the standard utilitarian welfare criterion. Further-
more, the mechanism can be modified to have a balanced budget.
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A recent paper by Albrecht, Anderson & Vroman (2010) investigated equi-
libria in models of search by committees. As is natural for many committees,
that paper does not allow side payments to be made during the search pro-
cess. Nevertheless the committee members have often other trade-offs even
if outright monetary transfers are not allowed. Consider the example of an
academic job applicant. Different research groups may derive different pay-
offs from hiring the candidate. Often there are other decisions within the
department that can be adjusted to compensate a given group. At the very
least, the department is also likely to hire in coming years. It is possible
to provide some incentives for the committee members by linking current
decisions to future ones.
Motivated by considerations of this type, we make the opposite assump-
tion in this note. We assume that utility is perfectly transferable between the
committee members. In other words, we assume that the preferences of the
committee members are quasilinear in transfers, and we adopt a mechanism
design approach to the committee decisions. It seems natural to require that
the budget be balanced in the committee. In other words, the members can-
not get outside financial help to resolve their conflict and they do not burn
money.
The dynamic pivot mechanism defined in Bergemann & Välimäki (2010)
can be used in the current setting to support the efficient choice of a candi-
date. The transfers required to implement this mechanism are easily com-
puted. In fact, these computations are much easier than the equilibrium com-
putations in the model without transfers. The committee decision problem
has similarities to a public goods provision problem. The chosen candidate
will have an effect on the welfare of all committee members. The opportunity
cost of not continuing the search can be thought of as the cost of the chosen
candidate. Nevertheless, this cost is just an opportunity cost and therefore
not reflected when balancing the budget. Hence in contrast to the problem
of providing a public good with a real production cost, we show that the
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dynamic pivot mechanism generates a surplus. By usual arguments, this
surplus can be rebated to the committee members in a manner that balances
the budget.
The insights in this note suggest that even if the committees cannot use
transfers, search can be conducted more effectively than by using simple vot-
ing rules. In more finely tuned deliberations, trade-offs between committee
members’ preferences are possible. This can be done e.g. by putting less
weight in future deliberations on the opinions of the committee members
that are blocking the selection of the current candidate.
In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section 3, we define the dynamic
pivot mechanism for this setting and show that an efficient mechanism with
a balanced budget exists. In Section 4, we discuss some extensions of the
result.
2 Model
2.1 Uncertainty and Payoffs
A committee consisting of N symmetric members i ∈ {1, ...N} must choose
one alternative from a countable sequence of candidates indexed by their time
of appearance t = 0, 1, ... All committee members discount future with the
same discount factor δ. A candidate t yields a payoff xit ∈ R to committee
member i if t is selected. Following Albrecht, Anderson & Vroman (2010) , we
assume that the xit are i.i.d. across the i and t and that they are distributed
according to a distribution function F. Denote the sum of payoffs amongst





By independence, z has distribution GN (·) that can be readily computed by
the convolution formula. The sum of the payoffs of all committee members
except i is denoted by z−i and again by independence, this random variable
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has distribution GN−1 (·) for all values of xit. We denote the realization of of
the vector of payoffs in period t by xt and the sequence of such vectors by
x = (x0, x1, ...).
The candidate selection is denoted by d = (d0, d1, ...) where dt = 1 indi-
cates that candidate t was selected. Since only one candidate can be chosen,
we have
dt = 1 ⇒ dt′ = 0 for all t ̸= t′.
Given the linear structure of payoffs, it is without loss of generality to consider
only deterministic allocations.
The committee members can also be asked to make transfers in each
period t. Let p = (p1t , ..., p
N
t ) denote the vector of transfers in period t and
let p = (p0, p1, ...) be the sequence of transfer vectors
The expected payoff for player i from an allocation (d, p) is given by




where the expectation is taken over the realizations xit.
Social welfare in the model is defined by the utilitarian welfare criterion
on the committee members ignoring the transfers for the moment.
W (x, d) =
N∑
i=1
vi (x, d) .
2.2 Direct Mechanism
Each xit is observed only by committee member i. We construct a direct
revelation mechanism where each committee member reports in each period
her payoff xit from this candidate. We denote these reports by r
i
t. The hiring
decisions dt ∈ {0, 1} must be decided based on the vector of reports rt rather
than on the true payoffs xt.
In order to give the committee members incentives to report truthfully,
i.e. to choose rit = x
i
t, we assume that they can be asked to make or receive
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transfers pit based on the vector of realized reports. We denote the profile of
reports in period t by rt and we let r = (r0, r1, ...).
A public history in period t is a sequence of decisions and reports in
the past periods, ht := (r0, d0, r1, d1, ..., rt−1, dt−1). Each player i also knows
her own past realized types hit := (x
i
0, r0, d0, x
i
1, r1, d1, ..., x
i
t−1, rt−1, dt−1). A
reporting strategy of player i is a sequence of functions
ρit : H
i
t × R → R.
Following (Bergemann & Välimäki 2010), a direct dynamic mechanism is
a pair of functions (dt (rt; tt) , pt (rt;ht)) . The mechanism is ex-post incentive



































Notice that here we are assuming that committee members other than
i report truthfully. By the one-shot deviation principle, it is sufficient to
check the incentives in period t only for player i. Notice also that in this ex
post criterion, all the values of the xit are assumed to be known up to t, but
expectations are taken over these variables for s > t.
3 The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
In order to compute the dynamic pivot mechanism we need to solve two





































It is a standard exercise in search theory to show that the optimal decision
rule for each of these cases is described by a cutoff policy that requires hiring
the first candidate for whom zt ≥ z∗k, where k is the number of players, and
z∗k solves







Denote the optimal values by obtained using the optimal cutoff strategies
after history ht and at current type profile xt byW (xt;ht) andW
−i (x−it ;ht) .1
The marginal contribution of player i is





The transfers are flow variables in the sense that they are paid each period
and the quantities on the right hand side are stock variables reflecting the
players’ payoffs in the dynamic game. Hence it is clear that the dynamic pivot
mechanism must account for this. For this reason, we define the dynamic
marginal contributions
mi (xt;ht) := M
i (xt)− δEM i (xt+1;ht+1) .













= mi (rt;ht) (1)
Bergemann & Välimäki (2010) show that the mechanism defined by
(d∗t (rt, ht) , p
∗
t (rt, ht)) is ex post incentive compatible and satisfies ex post
1Even though the optimal decision rule does not depend on histories, we are keeping
it in the notation to cover also the case discussed in the extensions where the committee
members learn about their own distribution of candidate types.
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individual rationality. The payoff from not participating in the mechanism is
understood to be the payoff to i resulting from the choice rule d∗−i. Therefore
we may use the realized values xit for the reported values in the formulas that
follow.
The next step is to calculate the payments in the dynamic pivot mecha-




t . Hence we have to cover






t . In the first, we have by definition
zt < z
∗N and z−it > z
∗N−1.
Therefore
W (xt;ht) = z
∗N and W−i (xt;ht) = z
−i
t .





= 0, δEW (xt+1;ht+1) = z∗N ,
and
δEW−i (xt+1;ht+1) = z∗N−1.







= z−it − z∗N + z∗N − z∗N > 0.
The last inequality follows from the assumption that
z−it > z
∗N−1.
Consider next the case where
zt > z
∗N and z−it < z
∗N−1.
Since d∗t = 1, it is easy to see that
W (xt;ht) = zt and W
−i (xt;ht) = z
∗N−1.
For the next period,









= zt − z∗N−1 > 0.
Since the payments are non-negative for all players at all realization of
the xit, this calculation shows that the dynamic pivot mechanism generates
a surplus.
4 Discussion
Budget Balance The dynamic pivot mechanism constructed is ex post
incentive compatible, individually rational and results in an ex post bud-
get surplus. In order to balance the budget, the transfers could be modi-
fied to bring the transfers to the level of the associated expected externality
mechanism. This would nevertheless come at a cost. In the dynamic pivot
mechanism, the committee members get as their payoff their marginal con-
tribution. In the modified balanced budget mechanism, this would no longer
be true. Hence there could be a potential trade-off between budget balance
and correct incentives to pay private participation costs in the committee.
Correlated Committee Members Since the dynamic pivot mechanism
satisfies ex post incentive constraints, the same construction remains valid
if the xit are correlated across i. The only adjustment needed to cover this
case is to note that the distribution GN(zn) is no longer a convolution of the
marginal distributions.
Learning the Payoff Distributions The dynamic pivot mechanism can
be modified to cover situations where the xit are correlated across t.. An
example of this would be models where each committee member draws payoffs





where the they learn in a Bayesian fashion about the θi. The main difference
in this setting would be that the optimal decisions now depend in a non-
trivial manner on the histories.
8
Interdependent Values Sometimes it is natural to think that the commit-
tee members have independent payoff relevant signals yit on the candidates.
To satisfy the appropriate monotonicity requirements, it must be assumed
that the signal of member i has a larger impact on i′s payoff than on the






yjt for some γ ≤ 1.
In this case, we could construct a dynamic version of the generalized VCG
mechanism to implement the efficient decision rule based on the reported
signals yit. The main difference compared to the dynamic pivot mechanism
would be in the calculation of the transfers. In the generalized VCG mech-
anism, the transfer of a pivotal player i that blocks an otherwise acceptable
candidate is calculated based on the societal payoffs from the highest yit that
overturns the decision of the other members. Similarly the transfer of the
pivotal player that forces the acceptance of an otherwise rejected candidate
would be computed based on the lowest signal overturning the decision.
It should perhaps be noted that even in the pure common values setting
where γ = 1, voting games perform quite badly whereas the generalized VCG
mechanism implements the efficient allocation without requiring transfers.
More Complicated Committee Decisions The dynamic pivot mech-
anism can be computed for committee decisions when multiple candidates
must be selected. The insights gained from the simplest model give some sug-
gestions for further work along this dimension even in cases where transfers
are ruled out. If the committee must select two candidates from a sequence
of potential candidates, an optimal decision rule can discipline those commit-
tee members that block the appointment of the current candidate by putting
less weight on their reports when deciding on future candidates. With two
candidates, the member that insists on getting her favorite candidate chosen
for the first slot can be made to pay an implicit price by discounting her
opinions when filling the second slot.
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